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Abstract
Is undecidability a requirement for open-ended evolution (OEE)? Using methods derived from algorithmic
complexity theory, we propose robust computational definitions of open-ended evolution and the adaptability of
computable dynamical systems. Within this framework, we show that decidability imposes absolute limits to the
stable growth of complexity in computable dynamical systems. Conversely, systems that exhibit (strong) open-
ended evolution must be undecidable, establishing undecidability as a requirement for such systems. Complexity
is assessed in terms of three measures: sophistication, coarse sophistication and busy beaver logical depth.
These three complexity measures assign low complexity values to random (incompressible) objects. As time
grows, the stated complexity measures allow for the existence of complex states during the evolution of a
computable dynamical system. We show, however, that finding these states involves undecidable computations.
We conjecture that for similar complexity measures that assign low complexity values, decidability imposes
comparable limits to the stable growth of complexity, and that such behaviour is necessary for non-trivial
evolutionary systems. We show that the undecidability of adapted states imposes novel and unpredictable
behaviour on the individuals or populations being modelled. Such behaviour is irreducible. Finally, we offer an
example of a system, first proposed by Chaitin, that exhibits strong OEE.
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
Broadly speaking, a dynamical system is one that changes over time. Prediction of the future behaviour of dynamical
systems is a fundamental concern of science generally. Scientific theories are tested upon the accuracy of their
predictions, and establishing invariable properties through the evolution of a system is an important goal. Limits
to this predictability are known in science. For instance, chaos theory establishes the existence of systems in
which small deficits in the information of the initial states makes accurate predictions of future states unattainable.
However, in this document we focus on systems for which we have unambiguous, finite (as to size and time) and
complete descriptions of initial states and behaviour: computable dynamical systems.
Since their formalization by Church and Turing, the class of computable systems has shown that, even without
information deficits (i.e., with complete descriptions), there are future states that cannot be predicted, in particular
the state known as the halting state [37]. We will use this result and others from algorithmic information theory to
show how predictability imposes limits to the growth of complexity during the evolution of computable systems. In
particular, we will show that random (incompressible) times tightly bound the complexity of the associated states.
The relationship between dynamical systems and computability has been studied before by Bournez [11, 10],
Blondel [9], Moore [32] and by Fredkin, Margolus and Toffoli [22, 30], among others. That emergence is a conse-
quence of incomputability has been proposed by Cooper [19]. Complexity as a source of undecidability has been
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observed in logic by Calude and Jurgensten [14]. Delvenne, Kurka and Blondel [21] have proposed robust definitions
of computable (effective) dynamical systems and universality, generalizing Turing’s halting states, while also set-
ting forth the conditions and implications for universality and decidability and their relationship with chaos. The
definitions and general approach used in this paper differ from those in the sources cited above, but are ultimately
related.
We will denote by K(x|y) the algorithmic descriptive complexity of the string x with respect to the string y.
The dynamical systems we are considering are deterministic, and each state must contain all the information needed
to compute successive states. We are assuming an infinity of possible states for non-cyclical systems. Mechanisms
and requirements for open-ended evolution in systems with a finite number of states (resource-bounded) have been
studied by Adams et al. [3].
1.1 Computable Functions
In a broad sense, an object x is computable if it can be described by a Turing machine [37]; for example, if there
exists a Turing machine that produces x as an output. It is clear that any finite string on a finite alphabet is a
computable object. We provide below a more formal definition, in the tradition of Turing.
As usual, we can define a one-to-one mapping between the set of all finite binary strings B∗ = {0, 1}∗ and the nat-
ural numbers by the relation induced by a lexicographic order of the form: {(“”, 0), (“0”, 1), (“1”, 2), (“00”, 3), ...}.
Using this relation we can see all natural numbers (or positive integers) as binary strings and vice versa. Accordingly
all natural numbers are computable.
A string p is a valid program for the Turing machine T if during the execution of T with p as input all the
characters in p are read. We call T (p) the output of the machine, if it stops. A Turing Machine is prefix-free if
no valid program can be a proper substring of another valid program (though it can be a postfix of one). We
call a valid program a self-delimited object. Note that, given the relationship between natural numbers and binary
strings, the set of all valid programs is an infinite proper subset of the natural numbers.
Formally, a function f : N → N is computable if there exists a Turing Machine T such that f(x) = T (x).
A Turing Machine U is considered universal if there exists a computable function g such that for every Turing
machine T there exists a string 〈T 〉 ∈ B∗ such that f(x) = U(〈T 〉g(x)), where 〈T 〉g(x) is the concatenation of the
strings 〈T 〉 and g(x). Given the previous case, 〈T 〉 and g(x) are called a codification or a representation of the
function f and the natural number x, respectively. From now on we will denote the codification of f and x by 〈f〉
and 〈x〉. The codification g(x) is unambiguous if it is injective.
For functions with more than one variable, if x is a pair x = (x1, x2), we say that the codification g(x) is
unambiguous if it is injective and the inverse functions g−11 : g(x) 7→ x1 and g
−1
2 : g(x) 7→ x2 are computable. If x
is a tuple (x1, ..., xi, ..., xn), then the codification g(x) is unambiguous if the function (x, i) 7→ xi is computable.
A sequence of strings δ1, δ2, ..., δi, ... is computable if the function δ : i 7→ δi is computable. A real number
is computable if its decimal expansion is a computable sequence. For complex numbers and higher dimensional
spaces, we say that they are computable if each of their coordinates is also computable.
Finally, for each of the objects described, we refer to the representation of the associated Turing machine as
the representation of the object for the reference Turing machine U , and we define the computability of further
objects by considering their representations. For example, a function f : R → R is computable if the mapping
〈xi〉 7→ 〈f(xi)〉 is computable and we will denote by 〈f〉 the representation of the associated Turing machine, calling
it the codification of f itself.
1.2 Algorithmic Descriptive Complexity
Given a prefix-free universal Turing Machine U with alphabet Σ, the algorithmic descriptive complexity (also known
as Kolmogorov complexity and Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity [25, 15]) of a string s ∈ Σ∗ is defined as
KU (s) = min{|p| : U(p) = s},
where U is a universal prefix-free Turing Machine and |p| is the number of characters of p.
Algorithmic descriptive complexity measures the minimum amount of information needed to fully describe a
computable object within the framework of a universal Turing machine U . If U(p) = s then the program p is
called a description of s. The first of the smallest descriptions (in alphabetical order) is denoted by s∗ and by 〈s〉,
a not necessarily minimal description computable over the class of objects. If M is a Turing machine, a program
p is a description or codification of M for U if for every string s we have it that M(s) = U(p〈s〉). In the case
of numbers, functions, sequences and other computable objects we consider the descriptive complexity of their
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smallest descriptions. For example, for a computable function f : R→ R, K(f) is defined as K(f∗), where f∗ ∈ B∗
is the first of the minimal descriptions for f .
Of particular importance for this document is the conditional descriptive complexity, which is defined as:
KU (s|r) = min{|p| : U(pr) = s},
where pr is the concatenation of p and r. This measure can be interpreted as the smallest amount of information
needed to describe s given a full description of r. We can think of p as a program with input r.
One of the most important properties of the descriptive complexity measure is its stability: the difference between
the descriptive complexity of an object, given two universal Turing machines, is at most constant. Therefore the
reference machine U is usually omitted in favor of the universal measure K. From now on we will omit the subscript
from the measure.
1.2.1 Randomness
Given a natural number r, a string x is considered r-random or incompressible if K(x) ≥ |x| − r. This definition
would have it that a string is random if it does not have a significantly shorter complete description than the string
itself. A simple counting argument shows the existence of random strings. Now, it is easy to verify that every
string x has a self -delimited, unambiguous computable codification with strings of the form 1log |s|0|s|s (log |s| 1s
followed by a 0, then the binary string corresponding to |s| concatenated with the string s itself [28, section 1.4]).
Therefore, there exists a natural r such that if x is r-random then K(x) = |x| − r + O(log |x|), where O(log |x|) is
a positive term. We will say that such strings hold the randomness inequality tightly.
Let M be a halting Turing Machine with description 〈M〉 for the reference machine U . A simple argument can
show t that the halting time of M cannot be a large random number. Let UH be a Turing Machine that emulates
U while counting the number of steps, returning the execution time upon halting. If r is a large random number,
thenM cannot stop in time r, otherwise the program 〈UH〉〈M〉 will give us a short description of r. This argument
is summarized by the following inequality:
K(T (M)) ≤ K(M) +O(1), (1)
where T (M) is the number of steps that it took the machine M to reach the halting state, the execution time of
the machine M .
1.3 Computable Dynamical Systems
Formally, a dynamical system is a rule of evolution in time within a state space; a space that is defined as the set of
all possible states of the system [31]. In this paper we will focus on a functional model for dynamical systems with
a constant initial state and variables representing the previous state and the time of the system. This model allows
us to set halting states for each time on a discrete scale in order to study the impact of the descriptive complexity
of time during the evolution of a discrete computable system.
A deterministic discrete space system is defined by an evolution function (or rule) of the formMt+1 = S(M0, t),
where M0 is called the initial state and t is a positive integer called the time variable of the system. The sequence
of states M0,M1, ...,Mt, ... is called the evolution of the system. Given a reference universal Turing Machine U , if
S is a computable function and M0 is a computable object, we will say that S is a computable dynamical system.
An important property of computable dynamical systems is the uniqueness of the successor state, which implies
that equal states must evolve equally given the same evolution function. In other words:
Mt =Mt′ =⇒ Mt′+1 =Mt+1. (2)
The converse is not necessarily true.
Now, a complete description of a computable system S(M0, t) should contain enough information to compute
the state of the system at any time and hence it must entail the codification of its evolution function S and a
description of the initial state M0, which is denoted by 〈M0〉. As a consequence, if we only describe the system
at time t by a codification of Mt, then we would not have enough information to compute the successive states
of the system. So we will specify the complete description of a computable system at time t as an unambiguous
codification of the ordered pair composed of 〈S〉 and 〈Mt〉, i.e. 〈(S, 〈Mt〉)〉, with 〈(S, 〈M0〉)〉 representing the initial
state of the system. It is important to note that, for any computable and unambiguous codification function g of
3
the stated pair, we have K(〈(S, 〈Mt〉)) ≤ K(S) +K(M0) +K(t) + O(1), as we can write a program that uses the
descriptions for S, M0 and t to find the parameters and then evaluate S(M0, t), finally producing Mt.
It is important to mention that, given that the dynamical systems we are considering are deterministic, and
that each state must contain all the information needed to compute successive states, we are assuming an infinity
of possible states for non-cyclical systems. Mechanisms and requirements for open-ended evolution in systems with
a finite number of states (resource-bounded) have been studied by Adams et al. [3].
1.4 Open-Ended Evolution in Computable Dynamical Systems
Informally, Open-ended evolution (OEE) has been characterized as “evolutionary dynamics in which new,
surprising, and sometimes more complex organisms and interactions continue to appear” [36]. Establishing and
defining the properties required for a system to exhibit OEE is considered an open question [7, 34, 35] and OEE
has been proposed as a required property of evolutionary systems capable of producing life [33]. This has been
implicitly verified by various experiments in-silico [29, 1, 27, 5].
One line of thought posits that open-ended evolutionary systems tend to produce families of objects of increasing
complexity [6, 5]. Furthermore, for a number of complexity measures, it can be shown that the objects belonging to
a given level of complexity are finite (for instance K(x)). Therefore an increase of complexity is a requirement for
the continued production of new objects. A related observation, proposed by Chaitin [18, 17], associates evolution
with the search for mathematical creativity, which implies an increase of complexity, as more complex mathematical
operations are needed in order to solve interesting problems, which are required to drive evolution.
Following the aforementioned lines of thought, we have chosen to characterize OEE in computable dynamical
systems as a process that has the property of producing families of objects of increasing complexity. Formally,
given a complexity measure C, we say that a computable dynamical system S exhibits open-ended evolution with
respect to C if for every time t there exists a time t′ such that the complexity of the system at time t′ is greater
than the complexity at time t, i.e. C(S(M0, t)) < C(S(M0, t
′), where a complexity measure is a (not necessarily
computable) function that goes from the state space to a positive numeric space.
The existence of such systems is trivial for complexity measures on which any infinite set of natural numbers
(not necessarily computable) contains a subset where the measure grows strictly:
Lemma 1. Let C be a complexity measure such that any infinite set of natural numbers has a subset where C
grows strictly. Then a computable system S(M0, t) is a system that produces an infinite number of different states
if and only if it exhibits OEE for C.
Proof. Let S(M0, t) be a system that does not exhibit OEE, and C a complexity measure as described. Then there
exists a time t such that for any other time t′ we have C(Mt) ≤ C(Mt′), which holds true for any subset of states
of the system. It follows that the set of states must be finite. Conversely, if the system exhibits OEE, then there
exists an infinite subset of states on which S grows strictly, hence an infinity of different states.
Given the previous lemma, a trivial computable system that simply produces all the strings in order exhibits
OEE on a class of complexity measures that includes algorithmic description complexity. However, we intuitively
conjecture that such systems have a much simpler behaviour compared to that observed in the natural world and
the artificial life systems referenced. To avoid some of these issues we propose a stronger version of OEE.
Definition 2. A sequence of naturals n0, n1, ..., ni, ... exhibits strong open-ended evolution (strong OEE) with
respect to a complexity measure C if for every index i there exists an index i′ such that C(ni) < C(ni′), and the
sequence of complexities C(n0), C(n1), ..., C(ni), ... does not drop significantly, i.e. there exists a γ such that i ≤ j
implies C(ni) ≤ C(nj) + γ(j) where γ(j) is a positive function that does not grow significantly.
It is important to note that while the definition of OEE allows for significant drops in complexity during the
evolution of a system, strong OEE requires that the complexity of the system not decrease significantly during
its evolution. In particular we will require that the complexity drops as measured by γ not grow as fast as the
complexity itself and that they reach a constant level an infinite number of times. Formally C(nj) − γ(j) should
not be upper-bounded for any infinite subsequence for the smallest γ where the strong OEE inequality holds.
We will construe the concept of speed of growth of complexity in a comparative way: given two sequences of
natural numbers ni and mi, ni grows faster than mi if for every infinite subsequence and natural number N , there
exists j such that ni−mj ≥ N . Conversely, a subsequence of indexes denoted by i grows faster than a subsequence
of indexes denoted by j if for every natural N , there exists i with i < j, such that ni − nj ≥ N .
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If a complexity measure is sophisticated enough to depend on more than just the size of an object, significant
drops in complexity are a feature that can be observed in trivial sequences such as the ones produced by enumeration
machines. Whether this is also true for non-trivial sequences is open to debate. However, if we classify random
strings as low complexity objects and posit that non-trivial sequences must contain a limited number of random
objects, then a non-trivial sequence must observe bounded drops in complexity in order to be capable of showing
non-trivial OEE. This is the intuition behind the definition of strong OEE.
Now, in the literature on dynamical systems, random objects are often considered simple ([2, pp.1]), with
complexity being taken to lie between regularity and randomness. Various complexity measures have been proposed
that assign low complexity to random or incompressible natural numbers. Two examples of such measures are logical
depth [8] and sophistication [26]. Classifying random naturals as low complexity objects is a requirement for the
results shown in section Beyond Halting States: Open-Ended Evolution.
2 A Computational Model for Adaptation
Let’s start by describing the evolution of an organism or a population by a computable dynamical system. It has
been argued that in order for adaptation and survival to be possible an organism must contain an effective repre-
sentation of the environment, so that, given a reading of the environment, the organism can choose a behaviour
accordingly [38]. The more approximate this representation, the better the adaptation. If the organism is com-
putable, this information can be codified by a computable structure. We will denote this structure by Mt, where t
stands for the time corresponding to each of the stages of the evolution of the organism. This information is then
processed following a finitely specified unambiguous set of rules that, in finite time, will determine the adapted
behaviour of the organism according to the information codified by Mt. We will denote this behaviour (or a theory
explaining it) using the program pt. An adapted system is one that produces an acceptable approximation of its
environment. An environment can also be represented by a computable structure E. In other words, the system is
adapted if pt(Mt) produces E. Based on this idea we propose a robust, formal characterization for adaptation:
Definition 3. Let K be the prefix-free descriptive complexity. We say that the system at the stateMn is ǫ-adapted
to the E if:
K(E|S(M0, E(n))) ≤ ǫ. (3)
The inequality states that the minimal amount of information that is needed to describe E from a complete
description of Mn is ǫ or less. This information is provided in the form of a program p that produces E from the
system at time n. We will define such a program p as the adapted behaviour of the system. It is not required that
p be unique.
The proposed structure for adapted systems is robust since K(E|S(M0, E, n)) is less than or equal to the
number of characters needed to describe any computable method of describing E from the state of the system at
time n, whether it be a computable theory for adaptation or a computable model for an organism that tries to
predict E. It follows that any computable characterization of adaptation that can be described within ǫ number
of bits meets the definition of ǫ-adapted, given a suitable choice of E, the adaptation condition for any given
environment. It is important to note that, although inspired by a representationalist approach to adaptation, the
proposed characterization of adaptation is not contingent on the organism ’s containing an actual codification of
the environment, since any organism that can produce an adapted behaviour that can be explained effectively (is
computable in finite time) is ǫ-adapted for some ǫ.
As a simple example, we can think of an organism that must find food located at the coordinates (x, j) on a
grid in order to survive. If the information in an organism is codified by a computable structureM (such as DNA),
and there is a set of finitely specified, unambiguous rules that govern how this information is used (such as the ones
specified by biochemistry and biological theories), codified by a program p, then we say that the organism finds the
food if p(M) = (j, k). If |〈p〉| ≤ ǫ, then the we say that the organism is adapted according to a behaviour that can
be described within ǫ characters. The proposed model for adaptation is not limited to such simple interactions. For
a start, we can suppose that the organism sees a grid, denoted by g, of size n×m with food at the coordinates (j, k).
The environment can be codified as a function E such that E(g) = (j, k) and ǫ-adapted implies that the organism
defined by the genetic codeM , which is interpreted by a theory or behaviour written on ǫ bits, is capable of finding
the food upon seeing g. Similarly, more complex computational structures and interactions imply ǫ-adaptation.
Now, describing an evolutionary system that (eventually) produces an ǫ-adapted system is trivial via an enu-
meration machine (the program that produces all the natural numbers in order), as it will eventually produce E
itself. Moreover, we require the output of our process to remain adapted. Therefore we propose a stronger condition
called convergence:
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Definition 4. Given the description of a computable dynamical system S(M0, E, t) where t ∈ N is the variable of
time, M0 is an initial state and E is an environment, we say that the system S converges towards E with degree ǫ
if there exists δ such that t ≥ δ implies K(E|S(M0, E, t)) ≤ ǫ.
For a fixed initial state M0 and environment E, it is easy to see that the descriptive complexity of a state of
the system depends mostly on t: we can describe a program that, given full descriptions of S, E, M0 and t, finds
S(M0, E, t). Therefore
K(S(M0, E, t)) ≤ K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) +K(t) +O(1), (4)
where the constant term is the length of the program described. In other words, as the time t grows, time becomes
the main driver for the descriptive complexity within the system.
2.1 Irreducibility of Descriptive Time Complexity
In the previous section, it was established that time was the main factor in the descriptive complexity of the
states within the evolution of a system. This result is expanded by the time complexity stability theorem (5).
This theorem establishes that, within an algorithmic descriptive complexity framework, similarly complex initial
states must evolve into similarly complex future states over similarly complex time frames, effectively erasing the
difference between the complexity of the state of the system and the complexity of the corresponding time, and
establishing absolute limits to the reducibility of future states.
Let F (t) = T (S(M0, E, t)) be the real execution time of the system at time t. Using our time counting machine
UH , it is easy to see that F (t) is computable and, given the uniqueness of the successor state, F increases strictly
with t, and hence is injective. Consequently, F has a computational inverse F−1 over its image. Therefore, we
have it that (up to a small constant) K(F (t)) ≤ K(F ) + K(t) and K(t) ≤ K(F−1) + K(F (t)). It follows that
K(t) = K(F (t)) + O(c), where c is an integer independent of t (but that can depend on S). In other words, for
a fixed system S, the execution time and the system time are equally complex up to a constant. From here on we
will not differentiate between the complexity of both times. A generalization of the previous equation is given by
the following theorem:
Theorem 5 (Time Complexity Stability). Let S and S′ be two computable systems and t and t′ the first time
where each system reaches the states Mt and M
′
t′ respectively. Then there exists c such that |K(Mt) −K(t)| ≤ c
and |K(Mt)−K(M
′
t′)| ≤ c. Specifically:
i) There exists a natural number c that depends on S and M0, but not on t, such that
|K(Mt)−K(t)| ≤ c. (5)
ii) If K(S(M0, E, t)) = K(S
′(M ′0, E
′, t′)) + O(1) and K(M0) = K(M
′
0) + O(1) then there exists a constant c
that does not depend on t such that |K(t)−K(t′)| ≤ c, where t and t′ are the minimum times for which the
corresponding state is reached.
iii) Let S and S′ be two dynamical systems with an infinite number of equally–up to a constant–descriptive complex
times αi and δi. For any infinite subsequence of times with strictly growing descriptive complexity, all but
finitely many j, k such that j > k comply with the equation: K(αk)−K(αj) = K(δk)−K(δj).
Proof. First, note that we can describe a program such that given S, M0 and E, runs S(M0, E, x) for each x until
it finds t. Therefore
K(t) ≤ K(S(M0, E, t)) +K(S) +K(M0) +K(E) +O(1), (6)
.Similarly for t′. By the inequality 4 and the hypothesized equalities we obtain
K(t)− (K(S) +K(M0) +K(E) +O(1)) ≤ K(Mt) ≤ K(t) + (K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) +O(1)),
which implies the first part. The second part is a direct consequence.
For the third part, suppose that there exists an infinity of times such that K(αk) −K(αj) > K(δk) −K(δj).
ThereforeK(αk)−K(δk) > K(αj)−K(δj), which implies that the difference is unbounded, which is a contradiction
of the first part. Analogously, the other inequality yields the same contradiction.
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The slow growth of time is a possible objection to the assertion that in the descriptive complexity of systems
time is the dominating parameter for predicting their evolution: the functionK(t) grows within an order of O(log t),
which is very slow and often considered insignificant in the information theory literature. However, we have to
consider the scale of time we are using. For instance, one second of real time in the system we are modelling may
mean an exponential number of discrete time steps for our computable model (for instance, if we are modelling
a genetic machine with current computer technology), yielding a potential polynomial growth in their descriptive
complexity. However, if this time conversion is computable, then K(t) grows at most at a constant pace. This
is an instance of irreducibility, as there exist infinite sequences of times that cannot be obtained by computable
methods. In the upcoming sections we will call such times random times and the sequences containing them will
be deemed irreducible.
2.2 Non-Randomness of Decidable Convergence Times
One of the most important issues for science is predicting the future behaviour of dynamical systems. The prediction
we will focus on is about the first state of convergence (definition 4): Will a system converge and how long will it
take? In this section we shall show the limit that decidability imposes on the complexity of the first convergent
state. A consequences of this is the existence of undecidable adapted states.
Formally, for the convergence of a system S with degree ǫ to be decidable there must exist an algorithm Dǫ
such that Dǫ(S,M0, E, δ) = 1 if the system is convergent at time δ and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we can describe a
machine P such that given full descriptions of Dǫ, S and M0 it runs Dǫ with inputs S and M0 while running over
all the possible times t, returning the first t for which the system converges. Note that δ = P (〈Dǫ〉〈S〉〈M0〉〈E〉).
Hence we have a short description of δ and therefore δ cannot be random: if S(M0, E, t) is a convergent system
then
K(δ) ≤ K(Dǫ) +K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) +O(1), (7)
where δ is the first time at which convergence is reached. Note that all the variables are known at the initial state
of the system. This result can summed up by the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Let S be a system convergent at time δ. If δ is considerably more descriptively complex than the system
and the environment, i.e. if for every reasonably large natural number d we have it that
K(δ) > K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) + d,
then δ cannot be found by an algorithm described within d number of characters.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of the inequality 7.
We call such times random convergence times and the state of the system Mδ a random state. It is important to
note that the descriptive complexity of a random state must also be high:
Lemma 7. Let S be a convergent system with a complex state S(M0, E, δ). For every reasonably large d we have
it that
K(S(M0, E, δ)) > K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) + d.
Proof. Suppose the contrary to be true, i.e. that there exist d small enough that K(S(M0, E, δ)) ≤ K(S)+K(E)+
K(M0) + d. Let q be the program that, given S, E, M0 and S(M0, E, δ), runs S(M0, E, t) in order for each t and
compares the result to S(M0, E, δ), returning the first time where the equality is reached. Therefore, given the
uniqueness of the successor state (2), δ = q(S,M0, E, S(M0, E, δ)) and
K(δ) ≤K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) +K(S(M0, E, δ)) + |q|
≤K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) + (K(S) +K(E) +K(M0) + d) +O(1),
which gives us a small upper bound to the random convergence time δ.
In other words, if δ has high descriptive complexity, then there does not exist a reasonable algorithm that
finds it even if we have a complete description of the system and its environment. It follows that the descriptive
complexity of a computable convergent state cannot be much greater than the descriptive complexity of the system
itself.
What a reasonably large d is has been handled so far with ambiguity, as it represents the descriptive complexity
of any computable method Dǫ. We may intend to find convergence times, which intuitively cannot be arbitrarily
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large. It is easy to ‘cheat ’ on the inequality 7 by including in the description of the program Dǫ the full description
of the convergence time δ, which is why we ask for reasonable descriptions.
Another question left to be answered is whether complex convergence times do exist for a given limit d, consid-
ering that the limits imposed by the inequality 7 loosen up in direct relation to the descriptive complexity of S, E
and M0.
The next result answers both questions by proving the existence of complex convergence times for a broad
characterization of the size of d:
Lemma 8 (Existence of Random Convergence Times). Let F be a total computable function. For any ǫ there
exists a system S(M0, E, t) such that the convergence times are F (S,M0, E)-random.
Proof. Let E and s be two natural numbers such that K(E|s) > ǫ. By reduction to the Halting Problem ([37])
it is easy to see the existence of F (S,M0, E)-random convergence times: Let T
′ be a Turing Machine, and St the
Turing machine that emulates T for t steps with input M0 and returns E for every time equal to or greater than
the halting time, and s otherwise. Let us consider the system S(M0, E, t) = St(〈T 〉〈M0〉〈t〉〈E〉).
If the convergence times are not F (S,M0, E)-random, then there exists a constant c such that we can decide
HP by running S′ for each t that meets the inequality |t| + 2 log |t| + c ≤ |S′| + |〈T 〉〈M0〉〈t〉〈E〉| + F (S,M0, E)
1,
which cannot be done, since HP is undecidable.
Let us focus on what the previous lemma is saying: F can be any computable function. It can be a polynomial or
exponential function with respect to the length of a given description for M0 and E. It can also be any computable
theory that we might propose for setting an upper limit to the size of an algorithm that finds convergence times
given descriptions of the system’s behaviour, environment and initial state. In other words, for a class of dynamical
systems, finding convergence times, therefore convergent states, is not decidable, even with complete information
about the system and its initial state. Finally, by the proof of the lemma, adapted states can be seen as a
generalization of halting states.
2.3 Randomness of Convergence in Dynamic Environments
So far we have limited the discussion to fixed environments. However, as observed in the physical world, the
environment itself can change over time. We call such environments dynamic environments. In this section we
extend the previous results to cover environments that change depending on time as well as on the initial state of
the system. We also propose a weaker convergence condition called weak convergence and propose a necessary (but
not sufficient) condition for the computability of convergence times called descriptive differentiability.
We can think of an environment E as a dynamic computable system, a moving target that also changes with time
and depends on the initial stateM0. In order for the system to be convergent, we propose the same criterion—there
must exist δ such that n ≥ δ implies
K(E(M0, n)|S(M0, E(M0, n), n)) ≤ ǫ. (8)
A system with a dynamic environment also meets the inequality 7 and lemmas 6 and 8 since we can describe a
machine that runs both S and E for the same time t. Given that E is a moving target it is convenient to consider
an adaptation period for the new states of E:
Definition 9. We say that S converges weakly to E if there exist an infinity of times δi such that
K(E(M0, δi)|S(M0, E(M0, δi), δi)) ≤ ǫ. (9)
As a direct consequence of the inequality 7 and lemma 8 we have the following lemma:
Lemma 10. Let S(M0, E(M0, t), t) be a weakly converging system. Any decision algorithm Dǫ(S,M0, E, δi) can
only decide the first non-random time.
As noted above, these results do not change when dynamic environments are considered. In fact, we can think
of static environments as a special case of dynamic environments. However, with different targets of adaptability
and convergence, it makes sense to generalize beyond the first convergence time. Also, it should be noted that
specifying a convergence index adds additional information that a decision algorithm can potentially use.
1For any string s there exists a self-delimited program (by a ‘print’) that takes a prefix-free input of the form 1log |s|0|s|s.
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Lemma 11. Let S(M0, E(M0, t), t) be a weakly converging system with an infinity of random times such that
k > j implies that K(δk) = K(δj) +∆Kδ(j, k), where ∆Kδ is a (not necessarily computable) function with a range
confined to the positive integers. If the function ∆Kδ(i, i +m) is unbounded with respect to i, then any decision
algorithm Dǫ(S,M0, E, i), where i is the i-th convergence time, can only decide a finite number of is.
Proof. Suppose that Dǫ(S,M0, E, i) can decide an infinite number of instances. Let us consider two times δi and
δi+m. Note that we can describe a program that, by using Dǫ, S, E and M0 and i together with the distance m,
finds δi+m. The next inequality follows:
K(δi+m) ≤ K(Dǫ) +K(i) +K(m) +O(1).
Next, note that we can describe another program that given δi and using Dǫ, S, E and M0 finds i, from which
K(i) ≤ K(Dǫ) +K(δi) +O(1) and −K(δi) ≤ K(Dǫ)−K(i) +O(1).
Therefore:
∆Kδ(i, i+m) = K(δi+m)−K(δi) ≤ 2K(Dǫ) +K(m) +O(1)
and ∆Kδ(i, i+m) is bounded with respect to i.
We will say that a sequence of times δ1, .., δi, ... is non-descriptively differentiable if ∆Kδ is not a total function,
which, as a consequence of the previous lemma, implies non-computability of the sequence.
Definition 12. We say that a sequence of times δ1, δ2, ..., δi, ... is non-descriptively differentiable if ∆Kδ(m) is not
a total function.
3 Beyond Halting States: Open-Ended Evolution
Inequality 7 states that being able to predict or recognize adaptation imposes a limit to the descriptive complexity
of the first adapted state. A particular case is the halting state, as shown in the proof of lemma 8. In this
section we extend the lemma to continuously evolving systems, showing that computability of adapted times limits
the complexity of adapted states beyond the first, imposing a limit to open-ended evolution for three complexity
measures: sophistication, coarse sophistication and busy beaver logical depth.
For a system in constant evolution converging to a dynamic environment, the lemma 11 imposes a limit to the
growth of the descriptive complexity of a system with computable adapted states: if the growth of the descriptive
complexity of a sequence of convergent times is unbounded in the sense of definition 12, then all but a finite number
of times are undecidable. The converse would be convenient, however it is not always true. Moreover, the next
series of results shows that imposing such a limit would impede strong OEE:
Theorem 13. Let S be a non-cyclical computable system with initial state M0, E a dynamic environment, and
δ1, ..., δi, ... a sequence of times such that for each δi there exists a total function pi such that pi(Mδi) = E(δi). If
the function p : i 7→ pi is computable, then the function δ : i 7→ δi is computable.
Proof. Assume that p is computable. We can describe a program Dǫ such that, given S,M0, δi and E, runs pδi(Mt)
and E(t) for each time t, returning 1 if δi-th t is such that pδi(t) = E(t), and 0 otherwise. Therefore the sequence
of δi’s is computable.
The last result can be applied naturally to weakly convergent systems (9): the way each adapted state approaches
to E is unpredictable, in other words, its behaviour changes over different stages unpredictably. Formally:
Corollary 14. Let S(M0, E, t) be a weakly converging system, with adapted states Mδ1 , ...,Mδi , ... and p1, ..., pi, ...
its respective adapted behaviour. If the mapping δ : i 7→ δi is non-descriptively differentiable then the function
p : i 7→ pi is not computable.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of applying the theorem 13 to the definition of weakly converging systems.
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While asking for totality might look like an arbitrary limitation at first glance, the reader should recall that in
weakly convergent systems the program pi represents an organism, a theory or other computable system that uses
Mδi ’s information to predict the behaviour of E(δi), and if this prediction does not process its environment in a
sensible time frame then it is hard to argue that it represents an adapted system or a useful theory.
The intuition behind classifying descriptively differentiable adapted time sequences as less complex is better
explained by borrowing ideas developed by Bennett and Koppel, within the framework of logical depth [8] and
sophistication [26], respectively. Their argument states that random strings are as simple as very regular strings,
given that there is no complex underlying structure in their minimal descriptions. The intuition that random
objects contain no useful information leads us to the same conclusion. And given the theorem 5, the states must
retain a high degree of randomness for random times.
Sophistication is a measure of useful information within a string. Proposed by Koppel, the underlying approach
consists in dividing the description of a string x into two parts: the program that represents the underlying structure
of the object, and the input, which is the random or structureless component of the object. This function is denoted
by sophc(x), where c is a natural number representing the significance level.
Definition 15. The sophistication of a natural number x at the significance level c, c ∈ N, is defined as:
sophc(x) = min{|〈p〉| : p is a total function and ∃y.p(y) = x and |〈p〉|+ |y| ≤ K(x) + c}
Now, the images of a mapping δ : i 7→ δi already have the form δ(i), where δ and i represent the structure and
the random component respectively. Random strings should bind this structure strongly up to a logarithmic error,
which is proven in the next lemma.
Lemma 16. Let δ1, ..., δi, ... be a sequence of different natural numbers and r a natural number. If the function
δ : i 7→ δi is computable then there exists an infinite subsequence where the sophistication is bounded up to an a
logarithm of a logarithmic term of their indexes.
Proof. Let δ be a computable function. Note that since δ is computable and the sequence is composed of different
naturals, its inverse function δ−1 can be computed by a programm which, given a description of δ and δi, finds the
first i that produces δi and returns it; thereforeK(i) ≤ K(δi)+|〈m〉|+|〈δ〉| andK(δ)+K(i) ≤ K(δi)+|〈m〉|+2|〈δ〉|.
Now, if i is a r-random natural where the inequality holds tightly, we have it that (K(δ) + O(log |i|)) + |i| − r ≤
K(δi) + |〈m〉|+ 2|〈δ〉|, which implies that, since δ is a total function, soph(|〈m〉|+2|〈δ〉|+r)(δi) ≤ K(δ) +O(log log i).
Therefore, the sophistication is bounded up to an alogarithm of a logarithmic term for a constant significance level
for an infinite subsequence.
Small changes in the significance level of sophistication can have a large impact on the sophistication of a given
string. Another possible issue is that the constant proposed in lemma 16 could appear to be large at first (but
it becomes comparatively smaller as i grows). A robust variation of sophistication called coarse sophistication [4]
incorporates the significance level as a penalty. The definition presented here differs slightly from theirs in order
to maintain congruence with the chosen prefix-free universal machine and to avoid negative values. This measure
is denoted by csoph(x).
Definition 17. The coarse sophistication of a natural number x is defined as:
csoph(x) = min{2|〈p〉|+ |〈y〉| −K(x) : p(y) = x and p is total},
where |〈y〉| is a computable unambiguous codification of y.
With a similar argument as the one used to prove lemma 16, it is easy to show that coarse sophistication is
similarly bounded up to an algorithm of a logarithmic term.
Lemma 18. Let δ1, ..., δi, ... be a sequence of different natural numbers and r a natural number. If the function
δ : i 7→ δi is computable, then there exists an infinite subsequence where the coarse sophistication is bounded up to
an a lgorithm of a logarithmic term.
Proof. If δ is computable and i is r-random, then by definition of csoph and the inequalities presented in the proof
of lemma 16, we have it that
csoph(δi) ≤2K(δ) + (|i|+ 2 log |i|+ 1)−K(δi)
≤2K(δ) + (|i|+ 2 log |i|+ 1)−K(i) + |〈M〉|+ |〈δ〉|
≤2K(δ) + |〈M〉|+ |〈δ〉| + (|i|+ 2 log |i|+ 1)− |i|+ r
=2K(δ) + |〈M〉|+ |〈δ〉| + r + 1 +O(log log i))
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Another proposed measure of complexity is Bennett’s logical depth [8], which measures the minimum compu-
tational time required to compute an object from a nearly minimal description. Logical depth works under the
assumption that complex or deep natural numbers take a long time to compute from near minimal descriptions.
Conversely, random or incompressible strings are shallow since their minimal descriptions must contain the full
description verbatim. For the next result we will use a related measure called busy beaver logical depth, denoted
by depthbb(x).
Definition 19. The busy beaver logical depth of the description of a natural x, denoted by depthbb(x), is defined
as:
depthbb(x) = min{|p| −K(x) + j : U(p) = x and T (p) ≤ BB(j)},
where T (P ) is the halting time of the program p and BB(j), known as the busy beaver function, is the halting
time of the slowest program that can be described within j bits [20].
The next result follows from a theorem formulated by Antunes and Fortnow [4] and from lemma 18.
Corollary 20. Let δ1, ..., δi, ... be a sequence of different natural numbers and r a natural number. If the function
δ : i 7→ δi is computable, then there exists an infinite subsequence where the busy beaver logical depth is bounded up
to an algorithm of a logarithmic term of their indexes.
Proof. By theorem 5.2 at [4], for any i we have it that |csoph(δi) − depthbb(δi)| ≤ O(log |δi|). By lemma 18 and
theorem 5 the result follows.
Let us focus on the consequence of lemmas 16 and 18 and corollary 20. Given the relationship established
between descriptive time complexity and the corresponding state of a system (theorem 5), these last results imply
that either the complexity of the adapted states of a system (using any of the three complexity measures) grows
very slowly for an infinite subsequence of times (becoming increasingly common up to a probability limit of 1 [13])
or the subsequence of adapted times is undecidable.
Theorem 21. If S(M0, E(t), t) is a weakly converging system with adaptation times δ1, ..., δi, ... that exhibits strong
OEE with respect to csoph and depthbb, then the mapping δ : i 7→ δi is not computable. Also, there exists a constant
c such that the result applies to sophc.
Proof. We can see the sequence of adapted states as a function Mδi : i 7→ Mδi . By lemmas 16 and 18 and
corollary 20, for the three stated measures of complexity, there exists an infinite subsequence where the respective
complexity is upper bounded by O(log log i). It follows that if the complexity grows faster than O(log log i) for
an infinite subsequence, then there must exist an infinity of indexes j in the bounded succession where γ(j) grows
faster than C(Mj). Therefore there exists an infinity of indexes j where C(Mj)− γ(j) is upper bounded. Finally,
note that if a computable mapping δ : i 7→ δi allows growth on the order of O(log log i), then the computable
function δ′ : i 7→ δ22i would grow faster than the stated bound.
Now, in the absence of absolute solutions to the problem of finding adapted states in the presence of strong
OEE, one might cast about for a partial solution or approximation that decides most (or at least some) of the
adapted states. The following corollary shows that the problem is not even semi-computable: any algorithm one
might propose can only decide a bounded number of adapted states.
Corollary 22. If S(M0, E, t) is a weakly converging system with adapted states M1, ...,Mi, ... that show strong
OEE, then the mapping δ : i 7→ δi is not even semi-computable.
Proof. Note that for any subsequence of adaptation times δj1 , ..., δjk , ..., the system must show strong OEE. There-
fore, by theorem 21, any subsequence must also not be computable. It follows that there cannot exist an algorithm
that produces an infinity of elements of the sequence, since such an algorithm would allow the creation of a com-
putable subsequence of adaptation times.
In short, the theorem 21 imposes undecidability on strong OEE and, according to theorem 14, the behaviour
and interpretation of the system evolves in an unpredictable way, establishing one path for emergence: a set of
rules for future states that cannot be reduced to an initial set of rules. Recall that for a given weakly converging
dynamical system, the sequence of programs pi represents the behaviour or interpretation of each adapted state
Mi. If a system exhibits strong OEE with respect to the complexity measures sophc, csoph or depthbb, by corollary
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14 and theorem 21 the sequence of behaviours is uncomputable, and therefore irreducible to any function of the
form p : i 7→ pi, even when possessing complete descriptions for the behaviour of the system, its environment and
its initial state. In other words, the behaviour of iterative adapted states cannot be obtained from the initial set of
rules. Furthermore, we conjecture that the results hold for all adequate measures of complexity:
Conjecture 23. Computability bounds the growing complexity rate to that of an order of the slowest growing
infinite subsequence with respect to any adequate complexity measure C.
3.1 A System Exhibiting OEE
With the aim of providing mathematical evidence for the adequacy of Darwinian evolution, Chaitin developed a
mathematical model that converges to its environment significantly faster than exhaustive search, being fairly close
to an intelligent solution to a mathematical problem that requires maximal creativity [18, 17].
One of the solutions Chaitin proposes is to find digital organisms that approximate the busy beaver function:
BB(n) = max{T (U(p)) : |p| ≤ n},
which is equivalent (up to a constant) to asking for the largest natural number that can be named within n number
of bits and the first n bits of Chaitin’s constant, which is defined as ΩU =
∑
T∈HP 2
−|T |, where HP is the set of all
halting Turing machines for the universal machine U . We will omit the subindex from Ω in the rest of this text.
Chaitin’s evolutionary system searches non-deterministically through the space of Turing machines using a
reference universal machine U ′ with the property that all strings are valid programs. This random walk starts with
the empty stringM0 = “”, and each new state is defined as the output of a Turing machine, called a mutation, with
the previous state as an input. These mutations are chosen stochastically according to the universal distribution
[24]. If these mutations help to more accurately approximate the digits of Ω, then this program becomes the new
state Mt+1, otherwise we keep searching for new organisms. Chaitin demonstrates that the system approaches Ω
efficiently (with quadratic overhead), arguing that this is evidence of the adequacy of Darwinian evolution [16].
Given that Ω can be used to compute BB(n) [23], a deterministic version of Chaitin’s system is the following:
M0 = 0
Mt = p.T (p) = max{T (U
′(q)) : H(Mt−1, q) ≤ w},
where H(Mt−1, p) is the distance between the programs Mt−1, q is the quantification of the number of mutations
needed to transform one string into the other, and w is a positive integer acting as an accumulator that resets to
1 whenever Mt increases in value, adding 1 otherwise.
Defining a computable environment or adaptation condition for this system is difficult since the system seeks to
approach an uncomputable function (BB) and the evolution rule itself is not computable given the halting problem.
The most direct way to define it is E(t) = BB(t) or, equivalently, as the first t-bits of Chaitin’s constant Ω.
Another way to define the environment is by an encoding of the proposition larger than U(Mt−1) for each time
t. Given that we can compute Mt−1 and its relationship with Mt given a description of the latter and a constant
amount of information (ǫ), we find adaptation at the times t where the busy beaver function grows.
It is easy to see that the sequence of programs i 7→ Mi is precisely what generates the busy beaver sequence
ηi = BB(i). Given that BB(t) is not a computable function, the evolution of the system, along with the respective
adaptation times, is not computable. Furthermore, this sequence is composed of programs that compute, in order,
an element of a sequence that exhibits strong OEE with respect to depthbb: let ηi = BB(i) be the sequence
of all busy beaver values; by definition, if i is the first value for which BB(i) was obtained, depthbb(BB(i)) =
min{|pi| − K(BB(i)) + i}, where U(Pi) = K(BB(i)). It follows that K(BB(i)) = |pi| and depthbb(BB(i)) = i,
otherwise pi would not be the minimal program.
Computing the system described requires a solution for the Halting Problem, and the system itself might also
seem unnatural at first glance. However, we can think of the biosphere as a huge parallel computer that is constantly
approximating solutions to the adaptation problem by means of survivability, and just as Ω has been approximated
[12], we claim that just as we cannot know whether a Turing machine will halt until it does, we may not know if
an organism will keep adapting and survive in the future, but we can know when it failed to do so (extinction).
4 Logical Depth and Future Work
Although we conjecture that the theorem 21 must also hold for logical depth as defined by Bennett [8], extending the
results to this measure is still a work in progress. Encompassing logical depth will require a deeper understanding
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of the internal structure of the relationship between system and computing time, beyond the time complexity
stability (5), and might be related to open fundamental problems in computer science and mathematics. For
instance, finding a low upper bound to the growth of logical depth of all computable series of natural numbers
would suggest a negative answer to the question of the existence of an efficient way of generating deep strings,
which Bennett relates to the P 6= PSPACE problem.
One way to understand conjecture 23 is that the information of future states of a system is either contained at the
initial state–hence their complexity is bounded by that initial state– or is undecidable. This should be a consequence
given that, for any computable dynamical system, the randomness induced by time cannot be avoided.
Given that we intend to expand upon these questions in the future, it is important to address the fact that the
diagonal algorithm that Bennett proposes for generating deep strings represents a contradiction to our conjecture:
The logical depth of a natural x at the level of significance c is defined as:
depthc(x) = min{T (p) : |p| −K(x) < c and U(p) = x}.
The algorithm χ(n, T ) produces strings of length n with depth T for a significance level n − K(T ) − O(log n),
where K(T ) must be smaller than n, and n must not be as large (or larger) than T to avoid shallow strings. One
possible issue with this algorithm is that the significance level is not computable, and we can expect it to vary
greatly with respect to K(T ): For large T with small K(T ) (such as T T
T
) the significance level is nearly n, which
suggests that, for a steady significance level with respect to times T with large K(T ), the growth in complexity
might not be stable. This issue, along with an algorithm that consistently enumerates pairs of n and T s such that
K(T ) < n << T for growing T ’s, will be explored in future work and its solution would require a formal definition
of adequate complexity measures. The fact that χ presents a challenge to the conjecture 23 would suggest an
important difference from the three complexity measures used in this article.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a formal and general mathematical model for adaptation within the framework of computable
dynamical systems. This model exhibits universal properties for all computable dynamical systems, of which Turing
machines are a subset. Among other results, we have given formal definitions of open-ended evolution (OEE) and
strong open-ended evolution and supported the latter on the basis that it allows us to differentiate between trivial
and non-trivial systems.
We have also shown that decidability imposes universal limits on the growth of complexity in computable
systems, as measured by sophistication, coarse sophistication and busy beaver logical depth. We show that as time
dominates the descriptive algorithmic complexity of the states, the complexity of the evolution of a system tightly
follows that of natural numbers, implying the existence of non-trivial states but the non-existence of an algorithm
for finding these states or any subsequence of them, which makes the computations for harnessing or identifying
them undecidable.
Furthermore, as a direct implication of corollary 14 and theorem 21, the undecidability of adapted states and
the unpredictability of the behaviour of the system at each state is a requirement for a system to exhibit strong
open-ended evolution with respect to the complexity measures known as sophistication, coarse sophistication and
busy beaver logical depth, providing rigorous proof that undecidability and irreducibility of future behaviour is
a requirement for the growth of complexity in the class of computable dynamical systems. We conjecture that
these results can be extended to any adequate complexity measure that assigns low complexity to random objects.
Finally, we provide an example of a (non-computable) system that exhibits strong OEE and supply arguments for
its adequacy as a model of evolution, which we claim supports our characterization of strong OEE.
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